

Frauds Suspected in South Korea's April 15 Election

On April 15, 2020, South Korea's 21th legislative election was held to select 300 members for the National Assembly, 253 from competing candidates at their respective districts and 47 from proportional party lists. The pre-election days are set on April 10 and 11.

Looking over the election results, one can easily notice a striking contrast between the pre-election day vote counts and the election day vote counts for the respective ruling and opposition parties. For each of 49 highly competitive districts in Seoul, the ruling party won 11.5% on average more votes on the pre-election days than on the election day while the opposition party lost the same percentage less on the pre-election days than on the election day. This pattern is similar throughout the country except Jeolla provinces where the ruling party is convincingly favored.

Such statistical anomaly caught the attention of Korean American scientists & engineers in the San Francisco Bay Area. Their subsequent statistical analysis using normal distribution shows the probability of such aforementioned event occurring in the Seoul districts turns out to be $1/10^{441}$, the same probability of one person winning the lottery for 70 weeks in a row.

Concurrently, Prof. Park Young-A at Myongji University in Seoul claims that the probability of such an event occurring at all 1000 voting places exclusively in favor of the ruling party is $1/2^{1000}$, the same probability of having all heads showing out of 1000 coins thrown.

Also, Mr. Cho Shua in Korea was able to extract a manipulation number for each district suspected to be used for the pre-election day vote counting for stealing the opposition party's votes. Using this same number, he was able to undo such manipulation to restore a normal distribution for each district using Excel. In addition, he pointed out where the manipulation might have occurred in software.

Also, Mr. Roy Kim was able to come up with a simple formula that can predict the vote counts to the accuracy of decimal percentage points.

Prof. Walter Mebane, Jr. at University of Michigan, a well-respected expert on the electoral fraud field, claims that most frauds are detected in the pre-voting. He reports that 10.4% of the votes, about 1.5 million votes, for the ruling party are fraudulent.

To explain the anomaly, the ruling party asserts that younger generations expected to be on their side over the opposition party turned out more on the pre-election days rather than the election day in explaining such abnormal statistics. The data, however, shows the opposite: the voters in 60's and older, the majority of whom are expected to favor the opposition party voted more on the pre-election days to avoid the would-be crowd election day, hoping for less exposure to COVID-19.

Furthermore, another type of votes for choosing a party, not a candidate, called the proportional party votes were counted rather by hands, not by machines. On pre-election days, these party votes show quite a discrepancy from the aforementioned candidates' votes counted by electronic counting machines, showing the ruling party winning on the average of 11.5% over the opposition party. This is extremely unlikely, given the current polarized political views in Korea. In fact, the proportional party

votes on the pre-election days follows very closely the votes of both the proportional party votes as well as the candidate votes on the election day.

All of the above analyses showing statistical unlikeliness bring about significant suspicion of malfeasances and bad actions which may have occurred in this election throughout the country with the exception of Jeolla provinces where the ruling party was expected to win convincingly.

Besides statistical concern aforementioned, there is another important issue relating to QR code used in the ballots just for the pre-election days. Korean election law allows only the use of barcodes on ballots. The barcode is supposed to include only the information of the election district and the responsible election administration committee. This election, however, used QR codes illegally that can contain far more information than barcodes. Furthermore, it contains a serial number that can be used to trace a specific voter, which violates the vote secrecy aspect. Such vote secrecy is guaranteed in the Constitution of South Korea. The illegal use of QR codes by the Korean Election Committee may justify further investigation. There was no QR codes used on the ballots of the election day



Photo1: The ballot of the pre-election days (QR code) vs. the ballot of the election day (no QR code)

Also, this February, the Election Committee awarded LG U+ the contract for vote counting products and other related hardware without the required bidding process. Such lack of competitive bidding on

the contract, the use of illegal QR codes and significant discrepancy between pre-election days and election day votes increase the need for an investigation.

Among all the possible scenarios using the QR code, Korean IT specialists' most probable scenario is the following: The vote counting machine equipped with Huawei telecom system detects QR codes, the data would be sent to a server in China. The server in China would produce fabricated results based on a programmed formula and send them back to the server at the Korean election committee.

Later, the aforementioned scientist, Roy Kim found such a formula used in the Chinese server, predicting accurately the same results throughout all affected districts. For example, the vote counts are confirmed to be one voter more or less depending on districts, suggesting the probable faulty program written by an incompetent programmer in China resulting in rounding errors. Also, it would be easy to hide or destroy all the rigging evidence in China outside of the Korean jurisdiction. |

In addition to the above, there were a few other suspicious incidents surrounding the 4/15 election.

1) The major media in Korea reported a landslide victory unanimously for the ruling party based on their own exit poll results collected only from the election day without knowing any data from pre-election days. There was no exit poll in pre-election days. Without pre-election data, the results from the election day voting would have predicted statistical ties instead of the landslide victory. This peculiar, unanimous media response before all necessary data were available demands further investigation.

2) Lee Geun-Hyeong, the new strategic planning chair of the ruling party, posted on social media the printed form of their estimated election results prior to the election.

Such estimated results match exactly the final results. The table of the estimated election results is shown in Photo2 with a subtitle as "using a 'revised' figure from the pre-election", incriminating himself and his party. Revised is an euphemism of Manipulated.

Also, during the counting of election day votes prior to the counting of pre-election votes, Park Si Hyung of the ruling party boasted publicly that the situation would drastically change once pre-voting counting would start. He predicted all the winners without exception.




Photo2: Lee Geun Hyeong’s audacious posting of his perfect prediction in social media. Especially, his prediction includes a subtitle of PRE-ELECTION “REVISED” FIGURE(inside red mark), incriminating himself and his party

Based on the above, the media and ruling party seemed to know the results before it was possible to know them.

The 2020 parliamentary election in Korea deserves a thorough and objective investigation to understand why and how this happened.

Korea’s political future would be in jeopardy. President Moon Jae-In controls the administration, the legislature, and more than a half of the Judiciary, and the press. He already started dismantling the free democratic system in Korea during only 3 years of his 5 yrs’ tenure. His run-away train has to be stopped. Foreign coverage of Korean election is essential to help the Korean people to understand the enormity of the situation.

Fortunately, forty complaints have been filed in the Korean court system in the respective election districts and at least five court orders for evidence preservation have been issued by the Korean court based on these issues. At last, the Korean press started the coverage of the

election irregularities on May 3, 2020 for the first time. The custody of the main servers at the Korean election committee, the vote classifiers, and the vote counting machines, the pre-voting ballots will be crucial to prove the allegation of the election frauds.



Photo3: Evidence gathering of ballots executed by the court order at a local election committee office in Seoul. A picketer with a sign stating "Death Execution To Election Fraudster" May 1, 2020




Photo4: Demonstrators gathering in front of the Korean Election Committee Office to preserve the election servers as fraud evidence (5/3/20)

References:

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1. Cho Shua (Basilis TV, Gong Byung-Ho TV)
1. Prof. Walter Bebane, Jr. (Ph. D in Political Science, 1985) Univ. of Michigan
<http://www-personal.umich.edu/~wmebane/Korea2020.pdf>
- 5) Korean election law 151
- 6) Gong Byeong-Ho (Ph. D. in Economics at Rice Univ in 1987), Gong Byeong-Ho TV (Youtube) with Cho Shua and Roy Kim
- 7) Gahrosero Research Institute (Youtube)

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